The Coin Conundrum

Counterinsurgency (COIN) has once again becomethe subject of contentious debate within the U.S.Army. Its supporters insist that the new approach enshrinedin the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Field Manual(FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, led coalition forces toturn the tide of the campaign in Iraq. Critics argue thatthe surge and the end of the Shia uprising, not COIN,led to the dramatic decline in violence from 2006-2009.The failure of the new approach in Afghanistan, theyclaim, supports their argument that expeditionaryCOIN does not work. How this debate gets resolvedcould have significant implications for U.S. Armyforce structure in a time of shrinking defense budgets.The author, Dr. Thomas R. Mockaitis, considerswhat role, if any, COIN should play in the Army ofthe future. He examines the U.S. military’s historicalexperience with intrastate conflict as background forunderstanding the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Hethen reviews the current debate over COIN...